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TORTS
William E. Crawford*
Halphen v. Johns Manville Sales Corp.'-Products Liability Rewritten
Tort suits are won or lost according to how the parties discharge
their respective burdens of persuading the jury of the merits of their
causes. The principal function of appellate decisions in tort is to frame
these burdens in such language that the trial judge may clearly and
accurately communicate his charges to the jury. As a necessary conse-
quence of framing these burdens, the appellate decisions also control
the evidence that is to be relevant in discharging the burdens.
Experience has shown that juries pay close attention to the law as
charged to them by the court. The words chosen by the court often
can mean the difference between winning and losing for a given party,
for the words can alter dramatically the degree of difficulty of persuasion
that a party faces in convincing the jury. Skilled artisans of the craft
of jury trial advocacy have as the very heart of their professional capacity
the ability throughout the trial and in closing argument to focus all of
the evidence to fit their cause favorably under the burden of persuasion
portrayed in the judge's charge to the jury. These simple truths underlie
all jury trials in tort.
In order to grasp the full impact of Halphen on the law of Louisiana
product liability, one must view each sentence of the opinion in light
of the foregoing truths, particularly with respect to the jury charges
which Halphen mandates and the evidence it deems relevant or irrelevant,
for if the opinion is to have any meaning, it must lie in its application
to jury trials. Viewed in this context, it can be seen immediately that
the opinion will have an enormous effect on the relative ease or difficulty
of the burdens of persuasion of the plaintiff and defendant.
Copyright 1986, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* James J. Bailey Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
I. 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986). The opinion was in response to a question certified
to the Louisiana Supreme Court by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. 755 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1985). The trial court entered judgment for plaintiff for
the wrongful death of her husband. The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
that judgment, 737 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1984), then vacated the panel opinion, 752 F.2d
124 (5th Cir. 1985) and certified the question.
In its final opinion, the court again affirmed the trial court in its rejection of the
preferred state-of-the-art defense, placing asbestos in the unreasonably dangerous per se
category, 788 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1986).
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Defects in Design
To give a concrete example of how new and different the burden
of persuasion is under Halphen, first regard the new test it sets forth
for finding a product unreasonably dangerous in its design. Prior to
Halphen our basic product liability law was found in Weber,2 under
which liability was cast in terms of defectiveness, which in turn was
based upon a finding of "unreasonably dangerous to normal use." The
determination of "unreasonably dangerous" was resolved through the
balancing process as laid down in Hunt and Entrevia.4 Perhaps the
most prevalent product liability jury charge in our district courts was
the reading of the principal paragraph in Weber setting forth the "un-
reasonably dangerous" requirement. In essence, such a jury charge per-
mitted finding the manufacturer liable because the product was defective,
because it was unreasonably dangerous to normal use, or because the
magnitude of the risk outweighed the utility and benefits of the thing.
Entrevia demonstrated that this balancing process also underlies the
determination of defect and unreasonable risk of harm in the Loescher,
theory of strict liability.
To a jury of ordinary persons, the Weber test conveyed the notion
that, to find liability, the jury must find that it just was not right for
a product to be made as it was, that it was wrong to have the product
on the market where it might injure people.6 To reach that state of
mind, to reach a finding of wrongfulness of the product, the jury in
evaluating the evidence under the admonition of "unreasonably dan-
gerous" simply relied upon its conscience and judgment as a group of
ordinary people in the community. Though in some cases the judge may
choose to further define the term "unreasonable," it is not essential to
a valid jury charge that he do so. Any further definition would not be
error so long as it did not create a charge so burdensome as to be
noncommunicative to the jury of the standards it ought to apply. For
instance, the balancing factors certainly may be added to the charge to
explain the term "unreasonably dangerous" in a design feasibility case.
In the context of finding a product unreasonably dangerous because
of its design, it is sufficient under the rule of Haiphen to charge the
jury to find for the plaintiff if "alternative products were available to
2. Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co., 250 So. 2d 754 (La. 1971).
3. Hunt v. City Stores, Inc., 387 So. 2d 585 (La. 1980).
4. Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d 1146 (La. 1983).
5. Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975).
6. 1982 Southern Methodist University Products Liability Institute, The Trial of a
Product Liability Case, Ch. 3, § 3.01, at 3-2: "[Blut, where a lawyer is relying upon the
technical law of strict liability in tort, and he does not satisfy the jury that somebody
did something wrong, somebody was negligent, he will probably lose."
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serve the same needs or desires with less risk of harm." 7 This substan-
tially lessens the plaintiff's burden in a design defect case. Under the
court's express language, liability can be found in this context "although
balancing under the risk-utility test leads to the conclusion that the
product is not unreasonably dangerous per se. ' 8 Consider the application
of this rule to a BMW automobile equipped with shoulder straps and
seat belts, as opposed to the airbag restraint system used in a Mercedes.
It would seem impossible under the balancing test to find the BMW's
design unreasonably dangerous under a risk-benefit balancing test (it
seems doubtful that any jury would find the automobile and the restraint
system alone to be unreasonably dangerous), yet under the Halphen
standard, a jury could impose liability. It is problematical whether under
this design category the term "unreasonably dangerous" need even ap-
pear in the charge, because under the express terms of the opinion, if
the "less risk of harm" is found, then the product is unreasonably
dangerous as a matter of law.
The same analysis flows with reference to a design case based upon
there being a feasible way to design the product "with less harmful
consequences." 9
Defects in Construction
Weber provided no distinct rule for defects attributable to construc-
tion or composition; apparently the balancing test was the basis for
finding a product unreasonably dangerous under this theory also. Under
Halphen, however, the product need only be found to contain "an
unintended abnormality or condition which makes the product more
dangerous than it was designed to be."' 0 This again is a comparative,
or relative, test, rather than a balancing test, as required by Weber.
Failure to Warn
The test set forth in Halphen for finding a product unreasonably
dangerous for failure to warn does not seem to be a balancing test,
since a product may be found to be unreasonably dangerous
if the manufacturer fails to adequately warn about a danger
related to the way the product is designed. A manufacturer is
required to provide an adequate warning of any danger inherent
in the normal use of its product which is not within the knowl-
edge of or obvious to the ordinary user."
7. Halphen, 484 So. 2d at 115 (emphasis added).
8. Id.
9. Id. (emphasis added).
10. Id. at 114 (emphasis added).
II. Id. at 114-15 (emphasis added).
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An analysis of the precise basis for liability under this theory is more
difficult than under the above theories, since the wording of the re-
quirement to warn does not make it clear whether a jury must consider
both the danger and the failure to warn thereof and conclude through
a balancing process that the net result is one of unreasonable danger.
The language simply does not require a balancing test.
Unreasonably Dangerous Per Se
Turning to the theory of "unreasonably dangerous per se," Halphen
provides that a product may be thus classified "if a reasonable person
would conclude that the danger-in-fact of the product, whether fore-
seeable or not, outweighs the utility of the product."'' 2 In a footnote,"
the court points out that the risk-utility test is to be invoked for this
theory of liability. The footnote further clarifies that the consumer
expectation test is not accepted. It thus appears that this theory of
liability is subjected to the traditional balancing test. The opinion ex-
plicitly provides that design defect or other type defect cases can be
tried under this theory. It is enlightening to note that, under the
section of the opinion dealing with "Empirical Elements,"' 4 the evidence
admissible under tl~e per se theory would be very limited. It would not
be admissible to introduce into evidence the date when the product's
danger became scientifically knowable. The evolution of the science and
technology and the dates on which improvements were feasible would
also be inadmissible. The state-of-the-art defense is thus eliminated in
a case tried solely under the per se theory. It may be that, other than
the traditional evidence of causation, the only expert evidence allowed
would be testimony regarding the danger-in-fact and the utility of the
product.
There remain some risks for a plaintiff trying a case under the per
se theory, even if he were basking in the apparent advantage of the
unavailability of a state-of-the-art defense. If the product in question
had been in use for a number of years and had been manufactured
prior to the manufacture and marketing of machines containing safety
devices, the plaintiff relying on the per se theory exclusively would not
be able to introduce a more recently manufactured machine for purposes
of a comparison. The opinion specifically precludes this when it says:
"Under this theory, the plaintiff is not entitled to impugn the conduct
of the manufacturer for its failure to adopt an alternative design or
affix a warning or instruction to the product."'"
12. Id. at 114.
13. Id. at 114 n.2.
14. Id. at 118.
15. Id. at 114.
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Overview
What practical effect will the new statement of these theories of
liability have on the win-loss record of plaintiffs and defendants? Re-
ferring to the truths of jury trials set out at the beginning of this writing,
a plaintiff has a vastly lessened burden of persuasion before the jury
under both the design theory dealing with "less risk of harm," and the
design theory dealing with "less harmful consequences."
A simple example illustrates the increased leverage of persuasion the
plaintiff enjoys under these two burdens. Assume that a rear-end collision
has occurred, and the victim is a passenger in the preceding car, which
is equipped with traditional stop lights located at the rear of the car
above the bumpers, or at the rear fenders. Assume further that causation
is satisfied by the following driver's testimony that he simply did not
notice the taillights in time to stop. A jury could find the victim's car
to be unreasonably dangerous to normal use by showing that other
similar passenger cars are equipped with a stop light showing through
the rear window, which common experience and most experts would
say is a device more likely to attract attention than one traditionally
located at the level of the fenders. Although it is not likely that a jury
looking at the automobile with the traditionally arranged stop lights
would find that car to be unreasonably dangerous under the balancing
process, the same jury would very likely find that the alternative vehicle,
with the elevated stop light in the rear window, did pose "less risk of
harm." Hence, the jury would find that the victim's automobile was
unreasonably dangerous to normal use, because there was less risk of
harm in an alternative product available on the market.
As a further example, one might consider again the case of a
Mercedes automobile with an airbag restraint system contrasted to a
BMW equipped only with seat belts and a shoulder harness. In such
cases, a knowledgeable plaintiff's trial attorney would undoubtedly ask
for special interrogatories to the jury, isolating the criterion of "less
risk." If that interrogatory is answered in the affirmative, then it follows
as a matter of law that the product is unreasonably dangerous to normal
use. Based on those simple grounds alone, the court might well find
the case ripe for a directed verdict in favor of plaintiff.
On a broader plain, the creation of theories of liability not founded
on the balancing process will lead to a divergence between products
which are actionable under Halphen, but not under Loescher, as it is
the balancing process which still underlies the finding of defectiveness
in the Loescher action. Thus, under the Halphen theories which do not
require the balancing test (design, warning, manufacture), it now seems
quite likely that in the traditional grouping of the owner of the thing
and the manufacturer of the thing as defendants, the manufacturer may
be held liable for his unreasonably dangerous product under a "less
19861
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risk" theory, but the owner may well be found not liable under Loescher,
because the thing was not defective under the balancing process. For
instance, in the foregoing examples of the rear window stoplight and
the Mercedes airbag restraint, a jury could find each of the vehicles to
be unreasonably dangerous to normal use under Halphen, but not de-
fective under the Loescher balancing process. It would therefore behoove
a defense attorney for the individual owner to put special interrogatories
to the jury to ensure that their standard for defectiveness was the
balancing process, separate from the 'Halphen standard for the manu-
facturer's liability.
Looking at other traditional theories inherent in the products liability
litigation, the state-of-the-art defense has been eliminated under the
unreasonably dangerous per se category, 6 and of course was never
relevant to the manufacturing or composition defect theory. It does
appear to be a defense in a case based on failure to warn or on the
design theories.' 7 Halphen emphasizes that in determining whether the
defendant could have known of and avoided the unreasonably dangerous
aspect of a product, the defendant will be held to the standard and
skill of an expert;" thus, if other manufacturers or experts in the field
have discovered the danger, this defendant will be held to have known
of it.
For the products liability defendant, Halphen makes some positive
clarifications strengthening the argument that his product was reasonable,
when raised in defense against the warning and design theories. The
court said, "fln fairness the manufacturer should be permitted to in-
troduce evidence and present argument as to the standard of knowledge
and conduct by which its conduct is to be judged."' 9 Whether or not
this standard for warning and design cases is called negligence, it very
effectively bases those theories on a rule of reasonable care. Perhaps
that terminology cannot be used in a charge to the jury or in opening
and closing arguments, but the evidence underlying and demonstrating
reasonable care is certainly admissible and will have a persuasive effect
on the jury. It remains to be seen how this latitude of defense will fare
in balancing off the "less risk of harm" burden of persuasion of the
plaintiff.
To allow the plaintiff the full advantage of the new burdens of proof
with the attendant exclusion of evidence not relevant under the Halphen
theories, the plaintiff may elect to try his case on any one or all of these
theories. Accordingly, the plaintiff is entitled to instructions that evidence
16. Id. at 114, 118.
17. Id at 115, 118.
18. Id. at 115.
19. Id. at 118 (emphasis added).
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may be considered only with respect to certain theories."0 This is a serious
departure from the fact-pleading theory historically obtaining in Louisiana
and set out expressly in the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. 2 Multi-
ple plaintiffs injured by the same product in a common accident may
well elect to plead their cases on different theories. Third party complaints
and cross-complaints certainly may be pleaded according to the plaintiff's
wishes, as would also be the case with reconventional demands. As pointed
out above, when a Loescher defect is involved, it will of course be pleaded
differently. It may be difficult to draft jury charges correctly delineating
these various paths so that an ordinary jury may apply them accurately.
20. Id. at 115.
21. La. Code Civ. P. art. 891.

